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1. Introduction 
 The relationship between South and North Korea in many fields, including politics, 
economics, and social affairs, has substantially improved over the past decade. Even though 
recent international developments surrounding North Korea do not presage a closer relationship 
between the two Koreas in the near future, a great many South Koreans view these developments 
as transitory and expect that the two Koreas will be reunified eventually.  
 A key issue of Korean reunification will be its cost. The reunification cost will depend 
on the political process of reunification, the political, economic, and social structure of North 
Korea after reunification, the productivity gap between the two Korean regions, and the fiscal 
policies that will be implemented in a reunified Korea. As to the first two aspects, there is little 
one can say at present, so we will work with simple assumptions and focus on the last two 
aspects.  We consider a hypothetical situation where the economic system of North Korea will 
make the transition from central planning and the current fiscal policies of South Korea will be 
implanted in the North Korean region of the newly unified country. We assess the cost of 
reconstruction of the North Korean economic system after the disintegration of its old regime, 
and estimate the taxes and transfers for North Korean residents and the cost of additional 
government provision of public goods to the North Korean region.  
 Previous research on the subject has focused mainly on reconstruction cost, producing a 
wide range estimates, from 6 percent (Lee 1993) to 25 percent (Park 1997) of South Korea’s 
GDP for 10 years after reunification.1 This past research, though, did not attempt a thorough 
investigation of the costs associated with other fiscal policy changes, even though the 
                                                 
1 Other previous research focusing on reconstruction cost includes An (1997) and Bae (1996). Differences among 
the estimates are due primarily to differences in the assumed speed of convergence of North Korean productivity to 
that of South Korea. 
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productivity gap between South and North Korea will inevitably increase expenditures on public 
goods and social welfare and limit the collection of taxes from the North Korean region for a 
considerable period after reunification. 
 The purpose of this paper is to assess the fiscal impact of the reunification of South and 
North Korea, by taking explicit account of projected changes in social welfare expenditures, 
government consumption, and the North Korean region’s tax bases, as well as direct 
reconstruction costs. We use Generational Accounting (GA) to do so, as GA is a natural tool for 
investigating how the costs of fiscal changes are distributed among different population cohorts. 
GA covers all relevant government fiscal policies, and its forward-looking properties allow us to 
explore how Korea’s public finances will be affected by future reunification. 
 Our findings suggest that early reunification will result in a large increase in fiscal 
burden for most current and future generations of South Koreans. The overall magnitude of this 
added fiscal burden is much larger than that of German reunification, because (i) the productivity 
gap between South and North Korea is much larger than that between East and West Germany 
before reunification and (ii) North Korea’s population is much larger, relative to the South, than 
was the case for East Germany relative to West Germany. The findings also suggest that 
increased spending on social welfare is much more important than direct reconstruction costs as 
a determinant of the added fiscal burden. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the basic concept 
of GA and the GA calculation methods. Section 3 explains the GA calculation procedure and data 
used to measure the fiscal impacts of reunification. Section 4 presents the accounts and discusses 
their implications. Section 5 summarizes findings and draws conclusions. 
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2. GA Calculation Method 
2.1. Basic Framework2 
 Generational Accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 
This constraint, written as equation (1), requires that the future net tax payments of current and 
future generations be sufficient, in present value, to cover the present value of future government 
consumption as well as service the government’s initial net debt. 
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 The first summation on the left-hand side of (1) adds together the generational accounts 
(the present value of the remaining lifetime net payments) of existing generations. The term Nt,t-s 
stands for the account of the generation born in year t-s. The index s in this summation runs from 
age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life. The second summation on the left-hand side of (1) 
adds together the present value of remaining net payments of future generations, with s 
representing the number of years after year t that each future generation is born. The first term on 
the right-hand side of (1) is the present value of government consumption. In this summation the 
values of government consumption, Gs in year s, are discounted by the pre-tax real interest rate, r. 
The remaining term on the right-hand side, gtW , denotes the government’s net wealth in year t − 
its assets minus its explicit debt. 
 Equation (1) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy. Holding the 
present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction in the present value of net taxes 
                                                 
2 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994) and Kotlikoff (1992) for further discussion. 
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extracted from current generations (a decline in the first summation on the left side of (1)) 
necessitates an increase in the present value of net tax payment of future generations. 
 The term Nt,k in (1) is defined by: 
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In expression (2), Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payments to the government made 
in year s by the generation born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the number of surviving 
members of the cohort in year s who were born in year k. For the generations who are born in 
year k, where k>t, the summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generation’s year of birth, 
the discounting is always back to year t. A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values 
of Nt,k, one for each existing and future generation, with the property that the combined present 
value adds up to the right-hand side of equation (1).  
 Note that generational accounts reflect only taxes and social insurance contributions 
(taxes henceforth) paid less transfers received. The accounts do not impute to particular 
generations the value of government’s purchases of goods and services because it is difficult to 
attribute the benefits of such purchases.3 Therefore, the accounts do not show the full net benefit 
or burden that any generation receives from government policy as whole, although they can 
show a generation’s net benefit or burden from a particular policy change that affects only taxes 
and transfers. Thus, generational accounting tells us which generations will pay for government 
spending, rather than telling us which generations will benefit from that spending. Another 
                                                 
3 Bovenberg and ter Rele (2000) tried to incorporate the incidence of government consumption into generational 
accounts, assuming that all current generations enjoy the same (per capita) benefits from both government 
consumption and the public capital stock, with the latter benefits set at the imputed rent on the public capital stock. 
However, their approach does not attempt to deal with the “public” nature of government-provided goods. 
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characteristic of generational accounting that should be understood at the outset is that, as its 
name suggests, it is an accounting exercise that, like deficit accounting, does not incorporate 
induced behavioral effects or macroeconomics responses of policy changes. As a corollary, it 
does not incorporate the deadweight loss of taxation in its measure of fiscal burden, again 
following the tradition of budget incidence analysis. 
2.2. The Standard Method 
 The traditional Generational Accounts are calculated in two steps. The first step involves 
calculation of the net tax payments of current generations (the first term on the left-hand-side of 
equation (1)). This is done on the basis of current fiscal rules without being constrained by the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government. In the second step, given the right-hand-side 
of equation (1) and the first term on the left-hand-side of equation (1), we determine, as a 
residual, the value of the second term on the left-hand side of equation (1), which is the 
collective payment, measured as a time-t present value, required of future generations. 
Accordingly, whereas the fiscal burdens for current generations are based entirely on current 
fiscal rules, the government budget constraint fully determines the fiscal burdens for future 
generations. Future generations are thus assumed to absorb the entire adjustment that is required 
to make the claims of various generations consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint.  
 Based on the collective amount required of future generations, we determine the average 
present value of lifetime net tax payments for each member of each future generation under the 
assumption that the average lifetime tax payments of successive generations rise at the 
economy’s rate of productivity growth. Leaving out this growth adjustment, the lifetime net tax 
payments of future generations are directly comparable with those of current newborns, since the 
generational accounts of both newborns and future generations take into account net tax 
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payments over these generations’ entire lifetimes. Measuring the generational imbalance as the 
difference between two lifetime tax burdens provides a measure for the sustainability of the 
public finances. If future generations bear a heavier tax burden than the newly born do, current 
fiscal rules will have to be adjusted in the future to meet the budget constraint. 
 The computation of the total net payment across generations requires information about 
average tax burdens and transfer payments by age and sex. The standard calculation method used 
to project the average values of particular taxes and transfer payments by age and sex starts with 
government forecasts of the aggregate amounts of each type of tax and transfer payment in future 
years. These aggregate amounts are then distributed by age and sex based on cross-sectional 
relative age-sex-tax and age-sex-transfer profiles derived from cross-sectional micro-data sets. 
For years beyond those for which government forecasts are available, age- and sex-specific 
average tax and transfer amounts are set equal to those for the latest year for which forecasts are 
available, with an adjustment for growth. 
 This procedure is based on the assumption that the age-sex-profiles of transfer payments 
and tax burdens do not change over time. The standard procedure also assumes that government 
purchases, transfer payments and tax revenues grow at the same rate as GDP, although in some 
cases they are broken down into age-specific components, with the assumption that each 
component remains constant per member of the relevant population, adjusted for the overall 
growth of GDP per capita. 
2.3. Extending the Standard Method 
 To reflect important characteristics of the Korean fiscal situation, we modify the 
approach just described, by incorporating prospective changes in the age profiles of transfer 
payments and tax burdens. There are two sets of factors underlying these prospective changes.  
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The first set would be present in South Korea even without reunification, while the other relates 
to changes associated with reunification. 
 First, the maturation of the National Pension system (NPS) will change the age profiles 
and aggregate levels of benefits and contributions in South Korea. The average National Pension 
benefit per member of cohorts aged 70 and older is low compared with that for those between 55 
and 70 at present, since a large proportion of the older age groups are not covered at all by the 
NPS. Aggregate benefit amounts among older age groups are also restricted by the program’s 
short history, which limits the number entitled to full benefits. However, maturation of the 
system will increase the average benefit payments to old-age groups, which will flatten the age 
profile of benefits and increase the number of pension recipients and the aggregate pension 
benefit amount. We expect to observe a similar trend of maturation of the National Pension 
system for North Korean residents after reunification. 
 Also, one can reasonably anticipate changes in social welfare expenditures, even if 
South Korea remains separate. Though limited in the past, aggregate transfer payments in South 
Korea by Medical Insurance and social welfare services and public assistance have increased 
rapidly over the past decade due to recent structural changes in social welfare policies. Even the 
current level of social welfare expenditure in South Korea, though, remains well below the 
OECD average. Therefore, we project that social welfare expenditure will increase more rapidly 
than other components of government expenditure for a considerable period. In particular, we 
assume that the per capita amount of social welfare expenditure will increase more rapidly than 
per capita GDP until it reaches the OECD average.4 
                                                 
4 The income elasticity of government expenditure on health care is based on estimates by Newhouse (1997), Leu 
(1983, 1986), Gertham et al. (1998, 1992) and the OECD (1993), whose values range between 1.2 and 1.4. 
Exceptionally low or high estimates are produced by Gerdtham (1991, 1992) (0.74), Moon (2000) (1.75) and the 
OECD (1993) (1.6). In the case of government expenditure on social security and welfare services, Moon (2000) 
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 Turning to factors associated with reunification, the National Pension benefit levels of 
South Korean participants will be affected, since pension benefits consist of two parts, an 
income-related part and flat part. The latter is computed based on the average income of all NPS 
participants. The participation of North Korean residents, whose average income is currently less 
than 10 percent of that of South Koreans, will lower the flat part of the NPS benefit substantially. 
Analyzing reunification also requires another extension of the standard methodology, to account 
for the heterogeneity of the two populations.  Rather than just separating each age cohort by sex, 
we also separate it by region, specifying different profiles for North and South Koreans. This will 
have important effects, not only on the tax side, but also on the expenditure side. For example, 
the Minimum Living Standard Security (MLSS) benefit, a social transfer program to aid low-
income households, will initially apply to many more North Korean residents under current rules.  
Thus, we require not only distinct profiles for North and South Koreans, but also changing 
profiles over time for North Koreans, as they make the assumed transition over time to income 
parity with South Koreans. 
 Finally, we also modify the presentation of generational accounts. The standard 
approach estimates the fiscal gap between current and future generations, assuming existing 
policy for current generations.  It is also customary to express this fiscal gap using other 
measures, such as the required changes in taxes and or transfer payments for current and future 
generations together.  Because it is likely that some of the burden will be placed on current 
generations, we take this latter approach one step further and actually present alternative 
estimates of the accounts for current generations, taking such projected increases in their fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated a high income elasticity (1.54). We make a very conservative assumption about the income elasticity (1.2) 
in order to avoid over-projection of government expenditure in these sectors. The upper bounds for expenditures on 
social security and welfare and health care are assumed to be 4.12 percent and 5.94 percent, respectively, of GDP, 
based on the OECD averages as of 1995. For detailed information about the future path of social welfare 
expenditure, see Auerbach and Chun (2003). 
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burden into account. We denote as GA1 the accounts as conventionally presented, and refer to 
the accounts incorporating the added taxes to restore fiscal balance as GA2.5 
3. Calculation Procedure and Underlying Assumptions
6 
 To produce generational accounts for North Korea, we require projections of population, 
taxes, transfers, government expenditures, initial government debt, and a discount rate. We also 
need to project the age-sex profiles of average income of North Koreans, since taxes and transfer 
payments of individuals are dependent upon their income level. We ignore the current fiscal 
policies of North Korea, based on the assumption that North Korean policies will be repealed. 
Therefore, we consider a hypothetical situation where the current fiscal policies in South Korea 
are implanted in North Korea after reunification.  
 The current fiscal policies in South Korea are classified into the following groups: social 
welfare policies, tax system, seigniorage, and government consumption. The social welfare 
policies are composed of public pensions, Medical Insurance (MI), Employment Insurance (EI), 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI), and social welfare services and public 
assistance (Minimum Living Standards Security System, MLSS, and other social transfer 
programs, OSTP). Taxes are classified as labor income taxes, capital income taxes, consumption 
taxes, taxes on asset holdings, taxes on asset transactions, and other taxes. Government 
consumption is broken down into expenditure on education and other government consumption. 
Except for public pensions (NPS), MLSS, and EI7, we follow standard procedure to compute the 
age-sex distribution of the components of fiscal policies: we start by projecting the aggregate of 
                                                 
5 This presentation method has been used by others in the past, including Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000) and 
Bovenberg and ter Rele (2000). 
6 For the detailed information about the GA calculation procedure for South Korea and its underlying assumptions, 
see Auerbach and Chun (2003). 
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each component, and then distribute the aggregate by age and sex based on cross-sectional 
relative age-sex-tax and age-sex-transfer profiles derived from cross-sectional micro-data sets. 
3.1. Population Projection (North Korea) 
 We employ the 2001 population projection model of the National Statistics Office 
(NSO) for South Korea’s population projections. We project current and future populations of 
North Korea using information about base-year age-sex distributions, death rates, and fertility 
rates, since neither the South Korean nor the North Korean government has published projections 
of the future North Korean population. The baseline year for our projection is 1993, the most 
recent year for which a North Korean government report is available. We convert the population 
distribution of 5-year-age intervals into one with 1-year-age intervals by assuming that, within 
each 5-year-age interval, the population is evenly distributed across ages.  
 We impute the age-sex-year profile of death rates based on the NSO projections of life 
expectancy in South Korea, since the age-sex profiles have not been published. For the 
imputation of age-sex profiles of North Korean death rates in a given year, we search for the 
‘equivalent year’ when the life expectancy of South Korea is the closest to that of North Korea, 
and then assume that the profiles for North Korea are the same as those in South Korea’s 
equivalent year.  
 The total fertility rate in North Korea as of 1993 is 2.16, much higher than that in South 
Korea (1.67 in 1993, 1.47 in 2000). We assume that the fertility rates as of 1993 are maintained 
until reunification and that after reunification they will approach those of South Korea. Since the 
total fertility rate of North Korea in 1993 is quite close to that of South Korea in 1983 (2.08), we 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 In the case of NPS contributions and benefits and MLSS benefits, the age-sex profiles as well as the growth rates 
of the aggregate amounts are assumed to change over time while, in the case of EI, only the growth rate of the 
aggregate benefit amount is assumed to change over time, with the age-sex profiles fixed. 
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assume that the fertility rates of North Korea after reunification follow the same path for South 
Korea since 1983. The assumed sex ratio of newborns is 106, which is standard in population 
projections. 
3.2. Projection of Average Income Profile (North Korea) 
 We impute the age-sex-year profiles of average income of North Koreans based on the 
information about the difference in per capita GDP between South and North Korea. We assume 
that the average labor productivity of North Korea is about 11 percent of that of South Korea in 
1993 based on the projection of Bank of Korea. To impute the productivity growth path, we 
divide the period after 1993 into 5 sub-periods: (i) 1994-2001; (ii) 2002-the year of reunification; 
(iii) stagnation period (for 5 years after reunification); (iv) a period of rapid growth (for 45 years 
after the stagnation period); and (v) a period of balanced growth. For period (i) we use historical 
data on the productivity growth reported by the NSO.8 The labor productivity growth in period 
(ii) is assumed 1 percent per annum, which is slightly lower than that of South Korea (1.5 
percent). For period (iii), we assume that the labor productivity will not grow, since in the 
process of disintegration of the old North Korean economic system stagnation will be inevitable. 
After the stagnation period, we expect a period of rapid growth, so that after the 45 years of 
period (iv) the labor productivity of North Korea converges to that of South Korea, i.e., the 
productivity of North Korean residents will catch up with that of South Koreans 50 years after 
reunification.9 For period (v), we assume that labor productivity grows at the same rate as in 
                                                 
8 The labor productivity growth rates for the period 1993-2001 are –5.2 percent (‘93), -3.1 percent (‘94), -5.1 percent 
(‘95), -4.6 percent (‘96), -7.3 percent (‘97), -2.1 percent (‘98), 5.2 percent (‘99), 0.3 percent (2000), and 2.7 percent 
(2001). 
9  The period assumed necessary for full integration of the two Koreas is much longer than that assumed by 
Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999) for the German unification (20 years), based on the much larger productivity gap 
between the two Koreas (North Korea’s level is 8 percent of South Korea’s as of 2000, whereas East Germany’s was 
37 percent of West Germany’s) and the fact that the ratio of North Korea’s population to South Korea’s (47 percent 
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South Korea. Given the path of labor productivity, we impute the age-sex profile of labor income 
under the assumption that the profiles are the same as that of South Korea, except for the gap in 
the absolute level of labor income.  
 Beginning with reunification, we require estimates of North Korea’s unemployment 
rates to project expenditures on EI benefits. In period (iii), we assume that the unemployment 
rate is 20 percent, since the skills of many North Korean residents will become obsolete 
immediately after reunification. 10  During period (iv) the unemployment rate is assumed to 
decrease gradually to reach the current unemployment rate of South Korea (3 percent), and this 
level is assumed to be maintained in period (v).  
 The age-sex profile of capital income is the same as for South Korea, except for the gap 
in the absolute level between the two Koreas. The gap is assumed the same as that in labor 
productivity. The resulting path of the capital income share in the North Korean region for period 
(iii) onward shows that share gradually rising from 38 percent to 40 percent.11  
3.3. Projecting National Pension Contributions and Benefits (South and North Korea)  
 The public pensions in South Korea consist of two different plans: National Pension 
(NPS) and Occupational Pensions. Since the Occupational Pensions cover a small portion of the 
whole population, we assume that the North Korean residents will be covered by the NPS after 
reunification. We project the NPS for South and North Korea in two steps. The first step is to 
project the distribution of insurants and benefit recipients in North Korea; in the second step, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
as of 2000) is much larger than that of  East to West Germany’s (26 percent as of 1989).  
10 The unemployment rate in the former East Germany after Germany’s reunification was about 15 percent. We 
expect the unemployment rate in the former North Korea after reunification to be much higher, since the 
productivity gap between South and North Korea is much larger than that between East and West Germany when 
they joined. 
11 The capital income share of South Korea for the past decade is about 40 percent. 
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recalculate the contribution and benefit amounts by age-sex-year for both South and North 
Korean residents.  
 In the first step, we assume that the distributions of insurants and benefit recipients of 
North Korea follows the same trends as the distributions of South Korea since the NPS’s 
introduction in 1988. In other words, we assume that the maturation of the NPS in the former 
North Korea follows the same path as in South Korea with the time lag between 1988 and the 
year of reunification. Therefore, we compute the ratio of South Korean insurants and benefit 
recipients by age and sex to the population of the same cohorts for the period since 1988; we 
then project the distribution of insurants and benefit recipients in North Korea by multiplying the 
ratio by the North Korean population by age and sex in the years after reunification.  
 In addition, we adjust the distributions by taking into account the difference in 
unemployment rates between South and North Korea, since we assume that the unemployment 
rates will be much higher in the North Korean area for a considerable time post-reunification. 
This adjustment is needed since the unemployment rates affect the contribution and benefit 
amount of each cohort.12 Instead of average income and benefit amount by age and sex, we 
adjust the distribution of insurants and benefit recipients. The distribution of insurants is adjusted 
by assuming that the number of insurants by age and sex in a given year is proportional to the 
employment rate. For the distribution of new benefit recipients, we assume that the number of 
new recipients by age and sex in a particular year is proportional to the average employment rate 
during each cohort’s economically active period.  
 In the second step, we recalculate the contribution and benefit amounts of South and 
North Korea. We compute the contribution amounts by taking into account average income 
                                                 
12 The benefits of a particular individual are affected by the employment rates over his lifetime, since the NPS 
benefit amount is proportional to the period of his contribution to the NPS.  
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levels, number of insurants by age and sex and unemployment rates. Given the distribution of 
benefit recipients and profiles of average benefit levels, the benefit amount of each cohort in 
South and North Korea is recalculated based on the pension benefit formula. Note that the level 
of pension benefits of South Korean recipients must be recalculated, since, as discussed above, 
the flat part of benefits will fall with the inclusion of North Koreans in the calculation of average 
income. 
3.4. Projecting the Distribution of MLSS Benefits (North Korea)  
 We compute the MLSS benefit level by age-sex-year by subtracting the average income 
of each group, including labor income and capital income, from the minimum living expense 
guaranteed by the Korean government. The minimum living expense guaranteed is computed by 
using the distribution of households and profiles of the minimum living expense guaranteed by 
the number of household members, and the resulting value is about 230,000 won per month as of 
2000. We assume that the minimum living expense guaranteed grows at the productivity growth 
rate of South Korea, and allow the profiles for North Koreans to change over time, consistent 
with their rising relative incomes. 
3.5. Projection of Other Fiscal Components (North Korea)  
Determining Generational Profiles 
 The profiles of taxes and transfers for North Korean residents, except for the NPS 
contributions and benefits and the MLSS benefits, are assumed the same as those for South 
Koreans, except for their absolute levels.13  
                                                 
13 For the age and sex profiles for South Korea, see Auerbach and Chun (2003). 
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Projection of Aggregates 
 The procedure for projecting aggregates of taxes, transfers and government consumption 
for North Korean residents after the reunification is basically the same as that for South Koreans 
described in Auerbach and Chun (2003). We assume the same scope of government activities, 
and follow the same procedure of decomposing government consumption, contributions and 
benefits of social insurance into (1) age-specific components and (2) non-age-specific 
components. The scope of government covers the central government, local government, public 
education institutions, social insurance programs, and non-profit organizations financed by the 
government and providing services such as research on the economy, science and public 
administration. The government consumption classified as age-specific includes government 
expenditure on education, health, and social security and welfare services.14 Social insurance 
contributions and benefits, and government non-contributory transfer programs such as OSTP 
are age-specific, and labor income taxes and capital income taxes are classified as age-specific.  
 The non-age-specific components of taxes, transfers and government consumption are 
assumed to increase at the rate of productivity growth. In the case of the components classified 
as age-specific, the amount per member of the relevant population grows at the rate of 
productivity growth. The only exceptions are expenditure on health and social welfare, whose 
amounts per member of the relevant age groups grows at a higher rate than productivity growth 
until reaching the OECD average.15 
 For North Korea, a difference in the procedure for projecting aggregate fiscal 
components is that we further classify the fiscal components into two groups: one in which the 
                                                 
14 Government consumption is classified as: general public service, defense, public order and safety, education, 
health, social security and welfare services, housing and community amenities, recreation-culture-religion, fuel and 
energy, agriculture-forestry-fishing, mining-manufacture-construction, transportation and communication, and other. 
15 See footnote 4. 
 16 
value per member of the relevant population grows at the productivity growth rate of South 
Korea and the other in which the value grows at the productivity growth rate of North Korea 
after reunification. The former group includes MI benefits and all components of government 
consumption. The latter group includes IACI benefits, OSTP benefits, all taxes and social 
insurance contributions, and seigniorage. Components of the latter group have benefit or tax 
formulae based on income or assets. Components of the former group, on the other hand, are not 
determined so mechanically, and we would not expect government to discriminate against North 
Koreans in these areas. Not covered by this two-way classification is the EI benefit, since we 
expect high unemployment rates during the transition period after reunification. We project the 
aggregate EI benefit expenditure under the assumptions that the average benefit is proportional 
to the average income of North Korean workers and the number of the recipients of EI benefits is 
proportional to the unemployment rate. 
 We also must add to government expenditure the reconstruction cost of North Korea, 
since after reunification the government and private sector of South Korea will inevitably 
transfer resources to the North Korean region in order to cushion the transition. Since, as 
discussed above, estimates of the reconstruction cost by previous researchers show a wide range, 
we derive our own estimate of the value following the procedure described in the appendix. Our 
estimate of the reconstruction cost is 10 percent of the GDP of South Korea for 20 years after 
reunification. In the base case, we assume that 50 percent of the reconstruction cost is paid by the 
government and the other half by the private sector. Therefore, government expenditure on the 
reconstruction of the North Korean economy amounts to 5 percent of South Korean GDP for 20 
years after reunification. 
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3.6. Government Net Wealth and Discount Rate (North Korea) 
 The North Korean government debt is assumed to be 14.9 trillion won as of 2000, based 
on the projection by the Bank of Korea (2001). We also assume that the debt, evaluated in 
present value, does not change until reunification. 
 We assume the same discount rate for government finance for the North Korean region 
as for the South Korean region: a real discount rate of 3.5 percent, reflecting a nominal discount 
rate of 6.5 percent and an inflation rate of 3 percent.  
4. Findings 
 The benchmark year in the GA calculation is 2000. We regard generations alive in the 
benchmark year as “current” generations and classify cohorts by age. We treat cohorts born in 
2001 and later as “future” generations. For the computation of the net payments of North Korean 
residents, we include the taxes and transfers from the time of reunification onward, i.e., we 
completely ignore the fiscal burden under the current North Korean regime, which is difficult to 
calculate. We consider a hypothetical situation where Korea is reunified in 2010.16  
4.1. Generational Accounts Disregarding Reunification 
 Table 1 reports standard generational accounts (GA1) for South Korea, assuming no 
reunification, under the base case assumptions for the productivity growth rate (1.5 percent) and 
the nominal discount rate (6.5 percent).17 Following past studies, we report two variants of the 
accounts: Net Payment I (NPI) which treats educational expenditures as government 
                                                 
16 There is much uncertainty about the timing of reunification. Changing the date does not change the qualitative 
results, except for some redistribution of fiscal burdens across generations. Results of a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to time of reunification are available upon request. 
17 The accounts are expressed in thousands of won, the domestic currency of South Korea. As of August, 2004, 
1,000 won were worth about US$0.86. 
 18 
consumption; and Net Payment II (NPII), which treats educational expenditures as transfer 
payments. 
 The table shows positive values of net payments for most cohorts alive in 2000 except 
for cohorts aged 90 or older, indicating that most generations will, on balance, pay more in 
present value than they receive. One reason for positive burdens even among the elderly is the 
high taxes on consumption, capital income and assets, relative to taxes on labor income.18 The 
age profile of the average tax burden on capital is more skewed to older age groups than that of 
labor income taxes, and the consumption tax burden for older age groups is quite high.  
 The more important reason that even older generations have positive net payments is 
that social welfare benefits such as public pension benefits, Medical Insurance (MI) benefits, 
Minimum Living Standards Security (MLSS) Benefits and other social welfare services (OSTP) 
were quite small in the aggregate as of 2000. Aggregate public pension and MI benefits were 1.1 
percent and 1.7 percent of GDP respectively as of 2000 and those for the MLSS and the OSTP 
were 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent of GDP respectively. However, maturation of the public pension 
system and the projected increase in social welfare expenditures will increase transfer payments 
to old-age groups. This maturation is shown in Figure 1, which displays the relative (to age-40 
males) benefit profile in 2000 along with the corresponding profiles projected at other dates 
through 2080.  As a result, the accounts for a wider range of old-age groups will turn negative in 
the future, given current policy. 
 Among current generations, net payments are largest around age 20, when people tend to 
join the labor market and start work. Therefore, they will experience the longest economic 
participation periods from this age. For example, the age-20 NPI (NPII) account is about 38 
                                                 
18 Revenues from consumption tax, capital income tax, taxes on asset holding, and labor income tax in South Korea 
as of 2000 were 9.1 percent, 5.1 percent, 1.3 percent, and 2.2 percent of GDP respectively.  
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percent (126 percent) higher than the age-0 account. There is a sharp decrease in net payments 
between ages 50 and 60, since around age 55 many workers tend to retire and acquire eligibility 
for social welfare benefits, including public pension benefits. 
 The row labeled “Future Gen.” indicates the present value of amounts that those born in 
2001 will, on average, pay, assuming that subsequent generations pay this same amount except 
for the adjustment for growth. The NPI (NPII) account for future generations is about 118 
percent (198 percent) larger than those for those aged 0, which implies that the current fiscal 
policies are not sustainable and that a substantial fiscal burden is shifted to future generations.  
 Table 1 also reports the present value, rest-of-life transfer benefits and tax burdens by 
category. The substantial negative entries for public pensions and Medical Insurance play a key 
role in the large overall generational imbalance. On the tax side, three important characteristics 
of the Korean tax system are: (i) the large share of consumption taxes; (ii) the relative 
unimportance of labor income taxes; and (iii) the large proportion accounted for by taxes on asset 
transactions. The largest present value (for age 0 and age 30) is the consumption tax, followed by 
the capital income tax, the tax on asset transactions, labor income tax, other taxes, and taxes on 
asset holdings. The present value of the tax burden on older age groups, relative to that on 
younger age groups, is heaviest for consumption taxes, followed by capital income taxes, taxes 
on asset holding, taxes on asset transactions, and labor income taxes. 
 Table 2 reports the magnitude of the adjustment of tax and social insurance contributions 
(tax, henceforth) and transfer payments required to attain long-run government budget balance 
under each of the scenarios discussed in the paper.19  The results for the base case simulation just 
discussed, given in column [1], indicate that a substantial adjustment is required, even without 
                                                 
19 Long-run budget balance is defined as the situation where the sum of current government net wealth and the 
present value of present and future flows of taxes and social insurance contributions equals that of transfer payments 
and government consumption. 
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reunification. The required adjustment is a 59.2 percent increase in tax burden if the adjustment 
is made only for generations born in 2001 and thereafter. If the adjustment is made to all cohorts 
alive in 2004 and later, the required tax adjustment represents a 20.1 percent increase in tax 
burden. If we delay the tax adjustment until 2010 (the assumed reunification year in subsequent 
simulations), the required tax adjustment reaches 23.1 percent. If the proportional increase in the 
tax burden is accompanied by the same percentage decrease in transfer payments to attain long-
run government budget balance, the magnitude of the required adjustment decreases to 35-39 
percent (if the adjustment is made only for the generations born in 2001 and later years), 12-13 
percent (if the adjustment is made to all the cohorts alive in 2004 and later) and 14-15 percent (if 
we delay the tax adjustment until 2010). 
4.2. Incidence of the Fiscal Burden of Reunification 
 Table 3 reports the standard Generational Accounts for South and North Korean 
residents by taking into account the fiscal impacts of reunification.20 The accounts for South 
Korean residents indicate that the reunification will substantially increase the fiscal burden on 
South Korean future generations, unless the current fiscal policies of South Korea are 
substantially altered.21 The Net Payment I (Net Payment II) of South Koreans, born 2001 and 
later, increases by 20.6 percent (30 percent) due to the reunification, if the additional burden is 
completely shifted to cohorts born in 2001 and later. 
                                                 
20 Under reunification, the accounts for South and North Korea combined are simply the population-weighted 
average of the two countries’ separate accounts. For the very old, the accounts are virtually the same as the accounts 
for South Korea, given the much lower current life expectancy in North Korea. 
21 The typical method to allocate the fiscal burden between subgroups of future generations is to assume the same 
increase in the fiscal burden relative to age-0 individuals of each subgroup. We cannot adopt this method, since the 
age-0 North Koreans have a negative account. Therefore, we allocate the net payments among future generations of 
South and North Koreans based on relative present values of lifetime earnings. That is, we assume that each future 
generation’s burden is fixed share of the present value of its lifetime earnings. 
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 Tables 4 and 5 and provide a breakdown of the accounts for South and North Koreans, 
respectively, into their components, for this base case reunification scenario.22  The increase in 
the fiscal burden is primarily due to the increase in transfer payments to North Korean residents. 
Table 5 shows that the net transfers to existing generations of North Koreans are accounted for 
primarily by public pensions, MI, EI, and MLSS. The present values of lifetime net transfers 
from MI, EI and MLSS for most existing North Korean generations are higher than those for 
South Koreans. In particular, MLSS benefits for the cohort born in 2000 in North Korea is about 
5.5 times as large as that for the same generation in South Korea. Even though the absolute level 
of net transfers from NPS to most existing North Koreans is lower than that to current South 
Koreans, its ratio to income is much higher for North Koreans.  
 Contrary to the high transfer payments to North Koreans, their tax burdens are very low. 
Comparing the accounts for the cohorts born in 2000, the labor income tax burden of North 
Koreans is 37.1 percent of that of South Koreans, the capital income tax 56.6 percent, the 
consumption tax 32.3 percent, asset holding tax 52.2 percent, and the asset transactions tax 35.7 
percent. As result, the accounts for all existing North Koreans (except for cohorts aged 90 and 
older, which are essentially empty) are negative.  This implies, not surprisingly, that reunification 
will transfer resources to current North Koreans, unless fiscal policies toward existing 
generations are substantially altered; most of the fiscal burden will be shifted to the future 
generations of South Korea. The magnitude of adjustment needed to attain long run budgetary 
balance will substantially rise. The required tax adjustment (see Table 2, column [2]) rises from 
23 percent to 53-54 percent due to reunification, if we adjust the tax burden from the year of 
reunification (2010). The required magnitude of increase in tax burden accompanied by the same 
                                                 
22 The components for South Korea given in Table 4 are the same as those in Table 1 for the no reunification case, 
except for public pensions, which, as discussed above, must be recalculated once North Koreans are included in the 
covered population. 
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decrease in transfers also rises substantially because of reunification, from 14-15 percent to 30-
32 percent. 
 Tables 6 and 7 show the alternative (GA2) generational accounts (for variant NPI) under 
the assumption that the adjustment that we estimate to be necessary for long-run budget balance 
is actually distributed to current and future cohorts in South and North Korea.23  These tables 
reflect the scenario in which the government increases the tax burden on all cohorts alive in the 
reunification year and later.24 The tax increase for South Koreans without reunification (column 
[1] of Table 2) is 23.1 percent of net payments under current fiscal policies; under reunification 
(column [2] of Table 2), the corresponding increase in net payments is 53.1 percent. Comparing 
columns [1] and [2] in Table 6, we can compute the changes in net payments due to reunification, 
given the assumed tax policy response. Under this scenario, the fiscal burden of reunification is 
still substantially shifted to future generations of South Koreans. Yet, at least in percentage terms, 
as shown in Figure 2, generations aged less then 75 as of 2000 would still bear a significant 
burden, experiencing a more than 20 percent increase in lifetime net tax burden; thus, under this 
realistic scenario, most of the generations alive in 2000 and thereafter will be much affected by 
the economic cost of reunification. The percentage increase in lifetime net payments exceeds 40 
percent for those born in 2051, 41 years after the reunification date. 
 The fiscal burdens of North Koreans after reunification are much lower for existing 
generations than those of South Korean residents, since the productivity gap between the two 
regions is still very large for a considerable time, and for the same period North Koreans will 
receive large amounts of transfer payments from such benefits as MLSS, EI, and MI. However, 
                                                 
23 The accounts for future generations in these tables are discounted from the year of birth and deflated to offset 
future productivity growth, so that they may be compared to the accounts for current generations. 
24 See the corresponding columns of Table 2, in the row labeled “NPI, Reunif. Year (2010).” 
 23 
the gap will decrease with the convergence in productivity between North and South. As can be 
seen by comparing column [2] of Table 7 and column [1] of Table 6, generations of North 
Koreans born after 2031 will face a higher lifetime net payment than would the same cohort of 
South Koreans in the absence of reunification. 
4.3. Policy Experiments and Sensitivity Analysis 
 We consider several other situations to investigate the relative importance of policy and 
economic variables in determining the fiscal burdens of reunification: [3] MLSS benefit 
reduction; [4] EI benefit reduction; [5] separate operation of NPS; and [6] higher cost of 
reconstruction of North Korea. In situation [3] we assume that the government specifies an upper 
limit (300 percent of the average wage of North Koreans) for MLSS benefits for North Korean 
residents in order to prevent an excessively rapid increase in MLSS expenditures. In situation [4], 
we assume that aggregate EI expenditure does not depend on the unemployment rate, under the 
assumption that a substantial part of the unemployed will be covered by the MLSS system. 
Scenario [5] assumes that the government maintains separate NPS systems in the two Korean 
regions, in order to prevent a decrease in the benefit levels of South Korean residents. Except for 
the separation, the same NPS system is assumed for the two regions. Case [6] assumes that the 
reconstruction cost incurred by the government is 10 percent of GDP for 20 years after the 
reunification instead of 5 percent, i.e., that government pays the whole cost of reconstruction of 
the North Korean economy. The accounts for these scenarios are reported in the corresponding 
columns of Tables 6 and 7, with summary measures reported in Table 2. 
 As these tables show, the reduction in MLSS benefits for North Koreans would have a 
substantial impact on the fiscal burden. The fiscal impact of the adjustment of EI is much smaller 
than that of MLSS. Imposing the restriction on MLSS benefits reduces the required tax 
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adjustment to attain long-term fiscal balance from 53-54 percent of the current tax burden to 49-
50 percent (see Table 2), while imposing the reduction in EI benefits reduces the tax adjustment 
only by 0.3 percent. 
 Separate operation of the NPS raises overall fiscal burdens, since the benefit level of the 
NPS for South Korean participants is not affected by reunification, while under the incorporated 
system, the benefit levels fall considerably due to North Korean participation. But the fiscal 
burden due to separate operation of the NPS is not very high. The required tax adjustment for 
long-term fiscal balance increases by 0.7 percent of current tax burden.  
 Doubling the assumed reconstruction cost from 5 percent to 10 percent of GDP for 20 
years after reunification substantially increases fiscal burdens. The required tax adjustment for 
long-term fiscal balance increases from 53-54 percent of the current tax burden to about 59 
percent. But the impact of this increase in reconstruction cost, equal in magnitude to the entire 
reconstruction cost initially assumed, is small relative to the overall impact of reunification on 
the required long-run tax adjustment, from 23 percent in case [1] to 53-54 percent in case [2], 
because a larger part of the reunification cost is attributable to the increase in social welfare 
expenditure, relative to the low taxes that North Koreans will pay. 
 Table 8 summarizes the sensitivity of our results, for variant NPI25 to variations in key 
parameters (productivity growth of South Korea26 and the interest rate27), the length of the 
                                                 
25 Those for NPII exhibit similar patterns. 
26  A higher growth rate in South Korea raises the reconstruction cost, since the required investment for the 
productivity of North Korea to catch up becomes larger. In the case where South Korean productivity growth is 2 
percent (1 percent), we assume that the reconstruction cost is 5.5 percent (4.5 percent) of South Korean GDP for 20 
years after reunification, instead of the value of our base case (5 percent). 
27 We try sensitivity analysis for higher interest rates than in the base case, since our base case interest rate is quite 
low compared with values typically assumed in previous research. 
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transition process for North Korea, and the behavior of North Korean fertility after reunification. 
The base case results already discussed are presented in bold in the table. 
 The generational imbalance is increasing with the interest rate and decreasing with 
growth rate. The percentage difference is quite sensitive to the variations in the growth rate28 and 
the interest rate, while the qualitative result that post-reunification fiscal policy in Korea is 
imbalanced is sustained for a realistic range of growth and discount rates. The variation due to 
these parameters in the tax (tax and transfer) adjustment required for fiscal balance, if imposed 
on cohorts born in the year of reunification and later, spans a relatively narrow range, from 45 
percent to 54 percent (from 29 percent to 32 percent). 
 The base case assumes 50 years for the period of complete convergence between the two 
Koreas. This assumption that convergence can be achieved in 50 years is generally regarded as 
optimistic. Therefore, we consider more pessimistic assumptions about the speed of convergence. 
A lower speed of convergence between South and North Korean productivity levels will increase 
generational imbalance and the fiscal burden of reunification. Table 8 indicates the quantitative 
impacts of more pessimistic assumptions concerning the adjustment process. If the adjustment 
process is completed in 70 years after the reunification instead of within 50 years, the required 
tax (tax and transfer) adjustment for long-term fiscal balance increases to 60 percent (36 percent) 
because of the delay. A higher speed of convergence thus significantly reduces the fiscal burden 
of reunification. 
 Finally, we reconsider our assumptions about North Korean fertility. Thus far, we have 
used the assumptions discussed above, that North Korean fertility will gradually fall from a rate 
well above that in South Korea, eventually converging to the South Korean fertility rate. But, if 
                                                 
28 The irregular pattern of the required adjustment with respect to the growth rate is due to the fact that there are two 
conflicting forces affecting fiscal burden. Increasing productivity increases government transfers and consumption 
as well as the tax bases of future generations. 
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the post-unification experience in Germany is any guide, the pattern may be different. In the few 
years after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the total fertility rate in East Germany fell sharply 
from a value well above that in West Germany to a value well below, then gradually recovered to 
the West German rate (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2003).29 Given the economic and 
social disruptions that would occur immediately after reunification, a sharper drop in the North 
Korean birth rate than we have assumed is certainly a reasonable possibility. Thus, we consider 
the alternative assumption that the North Korean fertility rate drops immediately upon 
unification to the South Korean rate. The result of this alternative assumption, shown in the last 
column of Table 8, is to increase the per capita burden of fiscal adjustment, if the entire burden is 
placed on the now smaller future generations, but to slightly lower the per capita burden, if 
current generations share in the burden. For no method of distributing the burden, though, does 
the change in fertility have a particularly large impact. 
4.4. Comparison with the Case of German Reunification 
 The fiscal burden of reunification is likely to be much heavier for Korea than for 
Germany. According to estimates by Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999) based on the NPII 
variant, the generational imbalance for the base case was 156.1 percent, while that of the Korean 
case under the same assumptions about the productivity growth rate (1.5 percent) and the real 
discount rate (5 percent ) is 897.3 percent. The required tax adjustment for long-term fiscal 
balance was much smaller in the German case. After Korean reunification, a 50.5 percent 
increase in the overall tax burden30 would be required to restore fiscal balance, the bulk of which 
                                                 
29 We are grateful to a referee for calling this to our attention. 
30 This percentage, for variant NPII, differs slightly from the value given in Table 8 for the same interest rate-growth 
rate combination, 49.8 percent, which is based on the NPI variant. 
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is directly attributable to the added cost of reunification. In Germany, only a 9.5 percent increase 
was estimated to be necessary to restore generational balance after reunification. 
 The difference in the reunification cost is mainly due to differences in the productivity 
gap and in relative population magnitudes. Productivity in North Korea relative to that of South 
Korea (8 percent of the South Korean level as of 2000) is much lower than that of East Germany 
relative to West Germany before unification (37 percent of the West German level). The 
population ratio of North to South Korea (47 percent as of 2000) is much larger than that of East 
to West Germany the year before German unification (26 percent as of 1989). Therefore, a much 
longer transition period for complete convergence will be needed in the Korean case, and the 
Korean government will inevitably pay much more during the transition for social welfare 
benefits and government consumption. 
 One other lesson from the German experience is that projections made prior to the 
reunification process may be optimistic. Relatively early in the process of reunification, Gokhale, 
Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1995) estimated a generational imbalance (based on variant NPI) of 
26 percent.  The comparable number reported by Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999) just four 
years later was 92 percent, reflecting the declining fiscal situation in Germany, at least part of 
which appears attributable to the cost of reunification. 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper has reevaluated the fiscal impacts of Korean reunification using Generational 
Accounting, considering the inter- and intra-generational redistribution of fiscal burdens among 
current and future generations of South and North Koreans that could result from reunification. 
Our findings suggest that early reunification will result in large increases in the fiscal burden for 
most current and future generations of South Korea. The magnitude of the fiscal impact of 
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Korean reunification appears much larger than that of German unification, as the productivity 
gap between South and North Korea is much larger than existed between East and West Germany, 
and because North Korea has a much larger population, relative to South Korea, than was true of 
East Germany relative to West Germany. The findings also suggest that the fiscal burden due to 
increased social welfare expenditure for the North Koreans (relative to their tax payments) is 
much more important than the reconstruction of the North Korean economic system in 
determining the fiscal burden of reunification.  
 Economic cooperation between the two Koreas, to help speed the growth of productivity 
in North Korea, could alleviate some of the projected burdens. Reforms of South Korea’s fiscal 
policies, needed to help restore fiscal balance even without reunification, take on added 
importance in light of the large added burdens of reunification. Without such reforms, the total 
fiscal burdens faced by South Koreans in the future will be substantially higher than at present, 
making it likely that the government will face strong resistance from South Korean residents and 
a difficult road to convergence of the two Korean economies. 
Appendix. Estimation of the Reconstruction Cost 
 We assume that the production technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
(A1) ( ) θθ −== 1),( eNKeNKFY  
 
where Y, K, N, and θ are GDP, the aggregate capital stock, aggregate labor (represented by the 
economically active population) and the capital income share. The term e accounts for the level 
of multifactor productivity, expressed in labor-augmenting units. 
 Under the assumption of a competitive labor market, the South-North wage ratio is: 
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 (A2) indicates that the wage gap results from differences in multifactor productivity as 
well as in capital intensity. We assume that, along path of convergence, the multifactor 
productivity gap is reduced by technology spillovers from South Korea to North Korea, i.e., that 
the reconstruction cost comes from paying for part of North Korea’s capital accumulation. 
By assuming a balanced growth path, i.e., 
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= , and solving (A2) for the ratio of aggregate 
capital stocks, we get: 
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 Using (A3), the paths assumed for the ratios of labor productivity (wS/wN) and 
economically active populations (NS/NN), and the assumed capital-output ratio of 3 (which pins 
down capital stock levels), we compute the path of North Korea’s aggregate capital stock 
required for its labor productivity to reach South Korea’s by the end of the transition. We then 
compute the corresponding path of (gross) investment in North Korea, under the additional 
assumption that the annual economic depreciation rate is 5 percent. We assume that the rate of 
investment by North Korea itself is the same as that of South Korea, and that the residual 
investment must be financed by South Korean residents for a period of 20 years after 
reunification. 
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Table 1. Generational Accounts (GA1) 
(No Reunification, S. Korea, 1,000 won) 
 
Age 
Net 
Payment 
I1) 
Net 
Payment 
II2) 
Public 
Pensions 
Medical 
Ins. 
Employ. 
Ins. 
IACI MLSS OSTP 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
56,025  
62,689  
67,649  
67,707  
77,218  
73,675  
64,700  
39,226  
36,720  
32,425  
22,226  
12,788  
14,370  
8,448  
6,407  
5,837  
2,818  
541  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
33,221  
37,207  
48,149  
56,834  
74,950  
73,611  
64,667  
39,195  
36,691  
32,399  
22,202  
12,767  
14,352  
8,432  
6,394  
5,827  
2,810  
535  
-2,547  
-1,510  
-486  
-9,349  
-8,914  
-9,174  
-14,596  
-11,430  
-15,271  
-18,117  
-35,332  
-27,882  
-23,520  
-22,910  
-21,396  
-8,371  
-6,317  
-3,756  
-1,366  
-990  
-626  
-324  
-223  
-10  
-5,100  
-4,164  
-3,793  
-3,687  
-3,746  
-4,433  
-5,248  
-5,936  
-6,834  
-7,514  
-8,034  
-8,219  
-7,764  
-6,864  
-5,476  
-4,185  
-3,243  
-2,376  
-1,635  
-1,022  
-384 
-684  
-765  
-844  
-933  
-958  
-819  
-706  
-625  
-590  
-512  
-450  
-411  
-324  
-245  
-233  
-181  
-136  
-98  
-67  
-42  
-16  
186  
220  
244  
260  
261  
238  
166  
143  
15  
-9  
-16  
95  
17  
19  
-54  
-43  
-33  
-25  
-18  
-11  
-4  
-2,544  
-2,501  
-2,431  
-2,364  
-2,281  
-2,183  
-2,145  
-2,104  
-2,098  
-2,076  
-1,995  
-1,958  
-1,894  
-1,742  
-1,468  
-979  
-665  
-340  
-260  
0  
0 
-3,344  
-3,349  
-3,231  
-3,162  
-3,136  
-3,106  
-3,056  
-2,927  
-2,832  
-2,716  
-2,593  
-2,475  
-2,381  
-2,287  
-1,889  
-1,491  
-1,144  
-864  
-612  
-392  
-149 
Future 
Gen. 
122,341 99,060       
 
Labor 
Income 
Tax 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
Con- 
sump-
tion Tax 
Tax on 
Asset 
Holding 
Asset 
Transac-
tions Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Seign- 
iorage 
Edu. 
Exp 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
7,265  
8,174  
8,982  
9,815  
10,624  
10,788  
9,951  
9,535  
7,761  
6,169  
4,033  
1,985  
588  
54  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
12,769  
14,788  
16,849  
19,160  
22,412  
23,492  
23,057  
21,978  
20,860  
20,016  
17,248  
15,181  
11,291  
8,582  
6,323  
4,101  
2,239  
974  
131  
49  
28 
37,745  
38,513  
38,963  
39,601  
40,150  
39,102  
36,440  
33,071  
29,603  
26,144  
22,862  
19,278  
15,834  
12,681  
9,893  
7,975  
5,453  
3,198  
52  
33  
13 
3,935  
4,404  
4,856  
5,368  
5,952  
6,207  
6,186  
5,939  
5,569  
5,318  
4,689  
3,830  
2,957  
2,082  
1,517  
908  
566  
233  
31  
3  
1 
8,745  
9,540  
10,199  
10,889  
11,680  
11,901  
10,837  
8,902  
7,275  
5,925  
4,895  
3,243  
1,601  
393  
38  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
6,227  
6,549  
6,813  
7,113  
7,417  
7,495  
7,077  
6,344  
5,638  
4,989  
4,299  
3,459  
2,655  
1,963  
1,404  
1,023  
708  
422  
125  
76  
29 
172  
194  
217  
244  
275  
264  
258  
239  
236  
211  
198  
175  
163  
130  
108  
74  
63  
42  
33  
19  
6 
-22,803  
-25,482  
-19,500  
-10,873  
-2,269  
-64  
-33  
-31  
-29  
-26  
-24  
-21  
-18  
-15  
-13  
-10  
-8  
-6  
-4  
-3  
-1 
 
Notes: 1) Educational expenditure treated as government consumption 
 
 2) Educational expenditure treated as government transfers 
 Table 2. Required Adjustments for Long-Term Budgetary Balance 
(unit: %) 
 
Scenario:9) [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Generational Imbalance1) 
NPI2) - 124.1 156.3 121.2 123.7 142.0 
NPII3) 
S. and N. 
Korea 
combined - 453.0 281.0 434.9 438.9 504.4 
NPI 118.4  164.5 156.3 163.9 166.9 185.6 
NPII 
S. Korea 
only 198.2 284.1 270.2 283.0 287.3 504.4 
Required Tax Adjustment for Long-Term Budgetary Balance4) 
NPI 
Current5) 
Future6) 
20047) 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 7) 
26.9  
59.2  
20.1  
23.1 
73.8  
111.4  
- 
53.1 
68.7  
103.7  
- 
49.4 
73.5  
110.9  
- 
52.8 
74.8  
113.0  
- 
53.8 
81.7  
123.4 
-  
58.7 
NPII 
Current 
Future 
2004 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 
26.9  
59.2  
20.1  
23.1 
74.7  
112.8  
- 
53.7 
69.6  
105.0  
- 
50.0 
74.4  
112.2  
- 
53.4 
75.7  
114.3  
- 
54.4 
82.6  
124.7  
- 
59.4 
Required Tax and Transfer Adjustment for Long-Term Budgetary Balance8) 
NPI 
Current 
Future 
2004 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 
17.8  
39.1  
13.1  
14.6 
46.9  
69.3  
- 
32.0 
44.5  
65.7  
- 
30.4 
46.7  
69.0  
- 
31.8 
47.1  
70.5  
- 
32.2 
51.9  
76.7  
- 
35.4 
NPII 
Current 
Future 
2004 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 
17.2  
34.5  
12.3  
13.8 
45.8  
61.5  
- 
30.1 
43.4  
58.3  
 
28.6 
45.6  
61.3  
- 
30.0 
46.0  
62.5  
- 
30.4 
50.6  
68.0  
 
33.3 
 
Notes:  1) Percentage difference in net payment between 2000 newborns and future generations 
 
 2) Net Payment I 
 
 3) Net Payment II 
 
 4) Percentage increase in tax burden to attain long-run budgetary balance 
 
 5) Tax burden and benefits of current generations (as of 2000) are adjusted, while those of  
  future generations not changed. 
 
 6) Tax burden and benefits of future generations are adjusted, while those of current  
  generations not changed. 
 
 7) Adjust tax burden and benefits for all the age groups from the respective year. 
 
 8) Percentage increase in tax burden and (the same) percentage decrease in benefits to  
  attain long-run budgetary balance. 
 
 9) [1] No reunification; [2] Base case; [3] MLSS benefit reduction; [4] EI benefit reduction; 
  [5] Separate operation of NPS; [6] Higher cost of reconstruction of North Korea 
    
 Table 3. Generational Accounts (GA 1) 
(Unit: 1,000 won, %) 
 
No Reunification Unified Korea 
S. Korea 
S. and N. Korea 
combined 
S. Korea N. Korea 
Age 
Net 
Payment 
I1) 
Net 
Payment 
II2) 
Net 
Payment 
I 
Net 
Payment 
II 
Net 
Payment 
I 
Net 
Payment 
II 
Net 
Payment 
I 
Net 
Payment 
II 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
56,025  
62,689  
67,649  
67,707  
77,218  
73,675  
64,700  
39,226  
36,720  
32,425  
22,226  
12,788  
14,370  
8,448  
6,407  
5,837  
2,818  
541  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485  
33,221  
37,207  
48,149  
56,834  
74,950  
73,611  
64,667  
39,195  
36,691  
32,399  
22,202  
12,767  
14,352  
8,432  
6,394  
5,827  
2,810  
535  
-2,547  
-1,510  
-486  
30,265  
37,556  
38,944  
42,509  
53,622  
51,802  
45,183  
25,085  
25,197  
19,837  
11,605  
1,759  
4,184  
1,729  
3,361  
3,751  
1,717  
536  
-2,542  
-1,507  
-484  
10,531  
18,049  
26,263  
35,437  
52,019  
51,749  
45,153  
25,058  
25,171  
19,814  
11,585  
1,743  
4,170  
1,718  
3,353  
3,745  
1,712  
530  
-2,546  
-1,510  
-485  
55,804  
63,011  
69,025  
70,435  
80,097  
77,398  
68,465  
44,428  
39,181  
33,354  
22,551  
13,067  
14,381  
8,456  
6,411  
5,838  
2,815  
541  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485  
33,001  
37,529  
49,525  
59,562  
77,828  
77,334  
68,432  
44,397  
39,152  
33,327  
22,527  
13,046  
14,363  
8,441  
6,398  
5,827  
2,807  
535  
-2,547  
-1,510  
-486  
-7,731  
-8,208  
-8,923  
-9,086  
-9,072  
-11,559  
-14,719  
-15,070  
-13,656  
-15,719  
-16,698  
-16,880  
-13,379  
-9,928  
-1,937  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
-22,899  
-16,972  
-10,754  
-9,137  
-9,098  
-11,583  
-14,741  
-15,090  
-13,673  
-15,734  
-16,710  
-16,890  
-13,386  
-9,933  
-1,938  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
Future Gen. 122,341  99,060 67,820 58,237 147,617 126,758 40,982 35,190 
Generational 
Imbalance(%) 
118  198 124 453 165 284 - - 
 
 Notes:  1) Educational expenditure treated as government consumption 
  
  2) Educational expenditure treated as government transfers 
 
 
 Table 4. Composition of Generational Accounts 
(base case, S. Korea, 1,000 won) 
 
Age 
Net 
Payment 
I1) 
Net 
Payment 
II2) 
Public 
Pensions 
Medical 
Ins. 
Employ. 
Ins. 
IACI MLSS OSTP 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
55,804  
63,011  
69,025  
70,435  
80,097  
77,398  
68,465  
44,428  
39,181  
33,354  
22,551  
13,067  
14,381  
8,456  
6,411  
5,838  
2,815  
541  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485  
33,001  
37,529  
49,525  
59,562  
77,828  
77,334  
68,432  
44,397  
39,152  
33,327  
22,527  
13,046  
14,363  
8,441  
6,398  
5,827  
2,807  
535  
-2,547  
-1,510  
-486  
-9,569  
-8,592  
-7,798  
-11,868  
-8,552  
-11,548  
-14,352  
-30,131  
-25,421  
-22,591  
-22,585  
-21,117  
-8,360  
-6,309  
-3,752  
-1,366  
-993  
-626  
-324  
-223  
-10  
 -5,100  
-4,164  
-3,793  
-3,687  
-3,746  
-4,433  
-5,248  
-5,936  
-6,834  
-7,514  
-8,034  
-8,219  
-7,764  
-6,864  
-5,476  
-4,185  
-3,243  
-2,376  
-1,635  
-1,022  
-384 
-684  
-765  
-844  
-933  
-958  
-819  
-706  
-625  
-590  
-512  
-450  
-411  
-324  
-245  
-233  
-181  
-136  
-98  
-67  
-42  
-16  
186  
220  
244  
260  
261  
238  
166  
143  
15  
-9  
-16  
95  
17  
19  
-54  
-43  
-33  
-25  
-18  
-11  
-4  
-2,544  
-2,501  
-2,431  
-2,364  
-2,281  
-2,183  
-2,145  
-2,104  
-2,098  
-2,076  
-1,995  
-1,958  
-1,894  
-1,742  
-1,468  
-979  
-665  
-340  
-260  
0  
0 
-3,344  
-3,349  
-3,231  
-3,162  
-3,136  
-3,106  
-3,056  
-2,927  
-2,832  
-2,716  
-2,593  
-2,475  
-2,381  
-2,287  
-1,889  
-1,491  
-1,144  
-864  
-612  
-392  
-149 
Future 
Gen. 
147,617 126,758       
 
Labor 
Income 
Tax 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
Con- 
sump-
tion Tax 
Tax on 
Asset 
Holding 
Asset 
Transac-
tions Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Seign- 
iorage 
Edu. 
Exp 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
7,265  
8,174  
8,982  
9,815  
10,624  
10,788  
9,951  
9,535  
7,761  
6,169  
4,033  
1,985  
588  
54  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
12,769  
14,788  
16,849  
19,160  
22,412  
23,492  
23,057  
21,978  
20,860  
20,016  
17,248  
15,181  
11,291  
8,582  
6,323  
4,101  
2,239  
974  
131  
49  
28 
37,745  
38,513  
38,963  
39,601  
40,150  
39,102  
36,440  
33,071  
29,603  
26,144  
22,862  
19,278  
15,834  
12,681  
9,893  
7,975  
5,453  
3,198  
52  
33  
13 
3,935  
4,404  
4,856  
5,368  
5,952  
6,207  
6,186  
5,939  
5,569  
5,318  
4,689  
3,830  
2,957  
2,082  
1,517  
908  
566  
233  
31  
3  
1 
8,745  
9,540  
10,199  
10,889  
11,680  
11,901  
10,837  
8,902  
7,275  
5,925  
4,895  
3,243  
1,601  
393  
38  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
6,227  
6,549  
6,813  
7,113  
7,417  
7,495  
7,077  
6,344  
5,638  
4,989  
4,299  
3,459  
2,655  
1,963  
1,404  
1,023  
708  
422  
125  
76  
29 
172  
194  
217  
244  
275  
264  
258  
239  
236  
211  
198  
175  
163  
130  
108  
74  
63  
42  
33  
19  
6 
-22,803  
-25,482  
-19,500  
-10,873  
-2,269  
-64  
-33  
-31  
-29  
-26  
-24  
-21  
-18  
-15  
-13  
-10  
-8  
-6  
-4  
-3  
-1 
 
 Notes: 1) Educational expenditure treated as government consumption 
  
  2) Educational expenditure treated as government transfers 
 Table 5. Composition of Generational Accounts 
(base case, N. Korea, 1,000 won) 
 
Age 
Net 
Payment 
I1) 
Net 
Payment 
II2) 
Public 
Pensions 
Medical 
Ins. 
Employ. 
Ins. 
IACI MLSS OSTP 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
-7,731  
-8,208  
-8,923  
-9,086  
-9,072  
-11,559  
-14,719  
-15,070  
-13,656  
-15,719  
-16,698  
-16,880  
-13,379  
-9,928  
-1,937  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0  
-22,899  
-16,972  
-10,754  
-9,137  
-9,098  
-11,583  
-14,741  
-15,090  
-13,673  
-15,734  
-16,710  
-16,890  
-13,386  
-9,933  
-1,938  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0  
-14,054  
-14,319  
-12,995  
-10,356  
-7,102  
-4,833  
-5,191  
-4,210  
-293  
-286  
-81  
-63  
-43  
-13  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
-6,729  
-7,657  
-8,249  
-8,716  
-8,894  
-9,090  
-9,028  
-8,781  
-8,329  
-7,651  
-6,611  
-5,301  
-3,836  
-2,418  
-364  
-3  
0  
-15  
0  
0  
0 
-1,057  
-1,157  
-1,161  
-1,046  
-917  
-771  
-644  
-527  
-397  
-287  
-190  
-115  
-81  
-53  
-7  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
48  
41  
33  
20  
11  
-10  
-14  
-4  
-4  
3  
-1  
0  
-3  
-2  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
-14,053  
-11,280  
-9,635  
-8,715  
-8,445  
-9,341  
-9,407  
-8,951  
-10,014  
-11,265  
-12,289  
-12,956  
-10,363  
-7,991  
-1,645  
-570  
-169  
-131  
-150  
0  
0 
-1,529  
-1,517  
-1,423  
-1,292  
-1,123  
-965  
-769  
-571  
-422  
-311  
-230  
-166  
-108  
-68  
-9  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
Future 
Gen. 
40,982 35,190       
 
Labor 
Income 
Tax 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
Con 
sump-
tion Tax 
Tax on 
Asset 
Holding 
Asset 
Transac-
tions Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Seign- 
iorage 
Edu. 
Exp 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
2,694  
2,340  
1,949  
1,577  
1,238  
867  
609  
462  
269  
121  
34  
3  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
7,231  
6,962  
6,339  
5,510  
4,607  
3,484  
2,735  
2,242  
1,655  
1,219  
812  
538  
322  
161  
21  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
12,182  
11,455  
10,193  
8,839  
7,390  
6,013  
4,644  
3,443  
2,541  
1,833  
1,287  
860  
549  
359  
53  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
2,056  
1,970  
1,782  
1,551  
1,307  
999  
782  
644  
483  
345  
237  
149  
93  
46  
7  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
3,118  
2,744  
2,289  
1,861  
1,461  
1,000  
724  
541  
382  
228  
105  
25  
2  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
2,275  
2,124  
1,875  
1,610  
1,333  
1,037  
798  
610  
449  
316  
213  
136  
82  
49  
7  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
87  
86  
80  
71  
61  
51  
42  
32  
24  
18  
14  
9  
6  
3  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
-15,168  
-8,764  
-1,831  
-51  
-26  
-24  
-22  
-20  
-17  
-15  
-12  
-10  
-7  
-5  
-1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
 
 Notes: 1) Educational expenditure treated as government consumption 
    
  2) Educational expenditure treated as government transfers 
 Table 6. GA 2 for South Korea 
(Tax Adjustment1), unit: 1,000 won) 
 
 [1]2) [2] [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Age Current Generations (as of 2000) 
0 
 5 
 10 
 15 
 20 
 25 
 30 
 35 
 40 
 45 
 50 
 55 
 60 
 65 
 70 
 75 
 80 
 85 
 90 
 95 
 99 
78,213  
86,595  
93,105  
93,125  
100,687  
95,177  
83,229  
55,231  
49,463  
42,015  
28,907  
17,574  
17,699  
10,608  
7,576  
6,313  
2,842  
546  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
106,768  
117,909  
127,457  
128,750  
133,947  
126,751  
111,002  
81,158  
68,439  
55,375  
37,895  
24,058  
22,025  
13,417  
9,096  
6,929  
2,870  
553  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
103,221  
114,088  
123,390  
124,691  
130,199  
123,316  
108,042  
78,601  
66,402  
53,842  
36,827  
23,293  
21,493  
13,072  
8,909  
6,853  
2,866  
552  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
106,523  
117,645  
127,176  
128,469  
133,688  
126,514  
110,798  
80,981  
68,298  
55,269  
37,821  
24,005  
21,989  
13,393  
9,083  
6,924  
2,870  
553  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
107,672  
118,336  
126,902  
126,875  
131,847  
123,726  
107,830  
76,481  
66,383  
54,747  
37,779  
23,929  
22,118  
13,476  
9,128  
6,944  
2,874  
553  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
112,229  
123,792  
133,718  
134,999  
139,718  
132,040  
115,561  
85,094  
71,574  
57,734  
39,539  
25,236  
22,844  
13,949  
9,383  
7,047  
2,876  
554  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
Year of 
birth 
Future Generations (born after 2000)3) 
2001 
2006 
2011 
2016 
2021 
2026 
2031 
2036 
2041 
2046 
2051 
78,792 
78,951 
80,013 
80,064 
81,146 
81,462 
81,495 
81,627 
81,570 
81,433 
81,398 
107,593 
109,064 
111,239 
111,658 
113,032 
113,618 
113,958 
114,411 
114,641 
114,766 
114,936 
104,015 
105,319 
107,353 
107,724 
109,059 
109,607 
109,908 
110,319 
110,516 
110,607 
110,751 
107,345 
108,805 
110,970 
111,386 
112,756 
113,340 
113,678 
114,126 
114,356 
114,479 
114,647 
108,508 
110,058 
112,276 
112,732 
114,139 
114,767 
115,134 
115,598 
115,838 
115,976 
116,153 
113,102 
114,831 
117,219 
117,714 
119,148 
119,791 
120,195 
120,707 
120,995 
121,170 
121,380 
 
 Notes: 1) Tax adjusted proportionally to attain long-run budgetary balance 
   
  2) [1] No reunification; [2] Base case; [3] MLSS benefit reduction; 
   [4] EI benefit reduction; [5] Separate operation of NPS; 
   [6] Higher cost of reconstruction of North Korea    
   
  3) For comparison purposes, accounts for future generations discounted 
   from year of birth and deflated to offset productivity growth 
 
 
    
 Table 7. GA 2 for North Korea 
(Tax Adjustment1), unit: 1,000 won) 
 
 [2] 2) [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Age Current Generations (as of 2000) 
0 
 5 
 10 
 15 
 20 
 25 
 30 
 35 
 40 
 45 
 50 
 55 
 60 
 65 
 70 
 75 
 80 
 85 
 90 
 95 
 99 
12,378  
10,064  
6,920  
4,218  
1,715  
-3,400  
-8,579  
-10,387  
-10,307  
-13,417  
-15,200  
-15,935  
-12,802  
-9,595  
-1,890  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
21,428  
17,554  
13,069  
9,598  
6,877  
2,434  
-2,939  
-5,174  
-4,078  
-5,884  
-6,439  
-6,234  
-5,133  
-3,965  
-1,391  
-569  
-168  
-108  
-150  
0  
0 
13,090  
10,896  
7,792  
5,019  
2,430  
-2,790  
-8,062  
-9,956  
-9,981  
-13,181  
-15,045  
-15,843  
-12,737  
-9,553  
-1,884  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
13,368  
11,102  
7,658  
6,116  
4,226  
-590  
-4,736  
-6,963  
-9,923  
-13,117  
-15,116  
-15,870  
-12,757  
-9,579  
-1,889  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
14,532  
12,022  
8,618  
5,644  
2,871  
-2,525  
-7,921  
-9,886  
-9,949  
-13,171  
-15,040  
-15,834  
-12,740  
-9,560  
-1,885  
-572  
-169  
-147  
-150  
0  
0 
Year of 
birth 
Future Generations (born after 2000)3) 
2001 
2006 
2011 
2016 
2021 
2026 
2031 
2036 
2041 
2046 
2051 
13,509 
19,597 
24,923 
40,408 
55,709 
69,163 
80,746 
90,483 
97,777 
103,148 
107,197 
23,151 
32,171 
40,523 
51,192 
61,728 
71,128 
79,671 
87,487 
94,089 
99,310 
103,247 
14,218 
20,269 
25,522 
40,899 
56,060 
69,351 
80,755 
90,327 
97,535 
102,880 
106,923 
14,121 
20,283 
25,665 
41,223 
56,550 
70,040 
81,713 
91,484 
98,812 
104,210 
108,287 
15,759 
22,378 
28,255 
44,271 
60,110 
74,046 
86,025 
96,059 
103,553 
109,088 
113,289 
 
 Notes: 1) Tax adjusted proportionally to attain long-run budgetary balance 
   
  2) [1] No reunification; [2] Base case; [3] MLSS benefit reduction; 
   [4] EI benefit reduction; [5] Separate operation of NPS; 
   [6] Higher cost of reconstruction of North Korea    
   
  3) For comparison purposes, accounts for future generations discounted 
   from year of birth and deflated to offset productivity growth 
 
  
 
   
 Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis 
(NPI, Unit: %; base case in bold) 
 
Growth Rate, % 1 1.5 2 1.5 
Real Discount 
Rate, % 
3.5 5 7 3.5 5 7 3.5 5 7 3.5 
Transition (years) 50 50 50 60 70 50 
North Korean  
fertility 
baseline low 
Generational Imbalance 
S. and N. Korea 
combined 
167.3 229.2 336.2 124.1 191.7 309.5  90.7 158.1 280.5 166.0 202.3 153.0 
S. Korea only 208.9 274.5 343.7 164.5 241.1 326.0 126.1 208.7 305.7 193.9 216.8 178.5 
Required Tax Adjustment for Long-Term Budgetary Balance 
Current 
Future 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 
65.4  
128.6  
53.7 
44.9  
169.3  
49.6 
30.8  
226.7  
44.7 
73.8  
111.4  
53.1 
48.8  
152.4  
49.8 
33.6  
213.8  
46.1 
88.4  
96.3  
53.0 
53.9  
136.1  
50.0 
36.7  
199.1  
47.2 
78.1  
120.5  
56.9 
81.2  
129.1  
60.1 
70.3 
114.3 
52.3 
Required Tax and Transfer Adjustment for Long-Term Budgetary Balance 
Current 
Future 
Reunif. Year 
(2010) 
41.6  
80.2  
32.1 
30.3  
110.6  
31.0 
22.0  
146.8  
28.9 
46.9  
69.3  
32.0 
32.9  
99.9  
31.3 
24.0  
139.6  
29.9 
55.7  
59.1  
31.8 
36.2  
89.1  
31.5 
26.1  
131.0  
30.7 
49.5  
73.9  
34.0 
51.5  
78.3  
35.7 
44.6 
71.6 
31.6 
      
 
 Figure 1. South Korean Public Pension Benefit Profile
(no reunification, relative to age-40 males)
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Figure 2. Percent Change in Net Payment due to Reunification
(South Korea, Tax Adjustment)
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